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Abstract
Often, preferences are driven by comparisons with choices not made. Pref-
erences of a decision-maker over a set of options may arise from regret, i.e.,
from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the decision maker. This is
natural when the decision maker has to choose between two options with ran-
dom outcomes. Once the uncertainty is resolved he will know what outcome
he received, but also what outcome he could have received had he chosen the
alternative option. This ex ante comparison may cause him regret if his actual
outcome is worse than the alternative.
We ask whether regret-driven behavior is consistent with non-expected
utility theories of choice. We show that the answer is no — such behavior is
inconsistent with the assumption that preferences are transitive. If choices are
made so as to minimize ex ante regret then preferences must be intransitive.
——————————
†Anderson School of Management, UCLA
‡Department of Economics, Boston College1 Introduction
Choice is usually modeled through preferences and a decision maker is assumed
to behave as if he has a preference relation   over a set of items X. These
preferences are representable by a utility function U, and for a given choice
set A, the decision makers acts as if he solves max{U(X) : X ∈ A}. There
are of course many reasons why one item is preferred to another. One possible
reason is that the decision maker anticipates his future feelings about the
choice he is about to make and would like to minimize possible bad feelings.
This approach is natural when the decision maker has to choose between two
(or more) random variables. Once the uncertainty is resolved he will know
what outcome he received, but also what outcome he could have received had
he chosen the alternative option. This comparison may cause him elation (if
his actual outcome is better than the alternative) or regret.
Formally, let X and Y be two random variables with money outcomes.
Let ψ(x,y) measure the regret a person feels when observing that he won x
while the alternative choice would have landed him y > x. When x > y, he
feels elation. Choosing X over Y thus leads, ex ante, to a random variable of
regret/elation. Choice is driven by regret/elation if there is a functional V over
regret/elation random variables such that X is chosen over Y iﬀ V (X,Y ) <
V (Y,X).
The question we ask is simple: What functionals V and regret/elation
functions ψ are consistent with transitive choice? That is, when is it true that
if V (X,Y ) < V (Y,X) and V (Y,Z) < V (Z,Y ), then V (X,Z) < V (Z,X) as
well? It is well known that if V is additively separable across states of nature,
that is, if
V (X,Y ) =
 
s
f(p(s),ψ(x(s),y(s)))
then ψ(x,y) = u(y) − u(x) and the choice between random variables is done
by maximizing expected utility (see Bell [4] and Loomes and Sugen [10]). We
show that this result does not depend on V being additively separable. In
other words, the only possible model of transitive regret is expected utility.
One can read this result in two diﬀerent ways. It oﬀers an axiomatization
of expected utility theory without making any references to mixture spaces
(see [9] for summary of terms and basic results). But the real contribution of
1the project is the impossibility result, namely that regret is inherently intransi-
tive. If so, one must either conclude that regret, despite its clear psychological
appeal, cannot be used in standard economic models, or that models of in-
transitive preferences must be incorporated into economics. In other words,
incorporating regret takes a lot more than a simple extension of preferences.1
2 Model
Let L be the set of ﬁnite-valued, non-negative random variables over (S,Σ,P)
with S = [0,1], Σ being the standard Borel σ algebra on S, and P =  ,
the Lebesgue measure. An X ∈ L is of the form X = {x1,p1;...;xn,pn) :
0   x1   ...   xn   ∞,
 
pi = 1}. Let   be a complete, transitive, and
monotonic preference relation over L. For X ∈ L, let FX be the distribution
of X, FX(x) = P(X   x). We make the following assumption on  .
Archimedean: For every X and T s. t. P(T) > 0 there is y s. t. (y,T;0,S\
T)   X.
Consider a box with n balls, numbered 1,...,n. Draw one ball at random,
and let X = (x1,S1;...;xn,Sn), where Si is the event “ball #i is drawn.”
Let π : {1,...,n} → {1,...,n} be a permutation of the n numbers and
let X(π) = (xπ(1),S1;...;xπ(n),Sn). If X ≻ X(π), then unless the decision-
maker’s evaluation of his monetary payoﬀ depends on the number selected,
it should also be the case that X(π) ≻ X(π2). By repeated arguments and
transitivity we obtain that X ≻ X(πn) = X, a contradiction. Transitivity
therefore more or less implies
State Independence: FX = FY implies X ∼ Y .
We investigate preferences that are driven by (binary) comparisons between
lotteries. Consider
1For models incorporating violations of transitivity and for discussions of such violations,
see eg. [5, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22].
2Deﬁnition 1 The function ψ : ℜ2
+ → ℜ is a comparison function if ψ(x,y)
is non-increasing in x and non-decreasing in y.
If at some state the lottery X yields x and the lottery Y yields y then
ψ(x,y) is a measure of the decision-maker’s ex post feelings (of regret if x < y
or elation if x > y) about the choice of X over Y . This leads to the next
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 Let X,Y ∈ L where X = (x1,S1;...;xn,Sn) and Y = (y1,S1;...;yn,Sn).
The comparison lottery evaluating the choice of X over Y is
Ψ(X,Y ) ≡ (ψ(x1,y1),p1;...;ψ(xn,yn),pn)
where pi = p(Si), i = 1,...,n.
Deﬁnition 3 The preferences   are driven by comparisons if there is a con-
tinuous comparison function ψ : ℜ2
+ → ℜ and a continuous functional V which
is deﬁned over comparison lotteries such that for any X,Y ∈ L
X   Y if and only if V (Ψ(X,Y ))   V (Ψ(Y,X)).
The functional V , which we assume is continuous and deﬁned over all ﬁnite-
valued comparison lotteries with an unbounded domain, measures the ex ante
feelings of regret and elation in the choice of X over Y . It is important to
note that once the uncertainty is resolved and the state of the world is known,
states that did not happen and their outcomes are no longer relevant. The
choice must be made before the uncertainty is resolved and only at that stage
does the decision maker take all possible regrets and elation into consideration.
For now, we restrict attention to comparison preferences which are regret
driven. Therefore, assume that
ψ(x,y) = 0, if x ≥ y
ψ(x,y) > 0, implies x < y.
Theorem: Let   be a complete, transitive, and monotonic preference re-
lation over L. In addition, assume that   satisﬁes state independence and
3Archimedean. If   is driven by regret-comparisons then it must be expected
utility.
The proof is broken up into a sequence of steps that are summarized below.
2.1 The functional V that evaluates the regret lottery Ψ(X,Y ) is a measure
of the epigraph of Ψ(X,Y ).
2.2 If V is a measure, then it must be a product measure that is linear in
probabilities.
2.3 If V is linear in probabilities, then the preferences over the underlying
money lottery must be expected utility.
We adopt the following notation for regret random variables (comparison
lotteries) in order to distinguish them from the random variables to which  
applies.
Regret random variables
Regret outcomes ψ(xi,yi) or ri, i = 1,2,...,n or a,b,c,...
Regret lotteries Ψ(X,Y ) = (ψ(x1,y1),p1;...;ψ(xn,yn),pn)
or R = (r1,p1;r2,p2;...;rn,pn)
Set of regret lotteries R
We state without proof
Lemma: For a given comparison lottery R = (r1,p1;...;rn,pn) there are
random variables X and Y such that Ψ(X,Y ) = R.
2.1 V is a measure
Let R be the set of ﬁnite (regret) lotteries over [0,∞) with the exclusion of
δ0, the lottery that gives 0 with probability one. Elements of R are denoted
R1,R2,... and their cumulative distribution functions are FR1,FR2,.... Let
MR1 ≡ min{r : FR1(r) = 1}
4and let Ro
1 be the closure of the epigraph of R1, i.e.,
R
o
1 ≡ {(r,p) : p ∈ [FR1(r),1]}.
We deﬁne  ∗ on R as follows:
R1  ∗ R2 iﬀ V (R1) ≤ V (R2), ∀R1,R2 ∈ R.
 ∗ is a complete and transitive preference relation. Consider the following
assumptions.
Continuity: Let R1,R2,R21,R22 ... be such that for any continuity point r
of FR2, FR2ℓ(r) → FR2(r). If for all ℓ, R1  ∗ R2ℓ, then R1  ∗ R2. If for
all ℓ, R2ℓ  ∗ R1, then R2  ∗ R1.
First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD):
∀r, FR1(r)   FR2(r) implies R1  ∗ R2.
Irrelevance: Let R1,R2,R′
1,R′
2 ∈ R. Let M = max{MZ : Z = R1,R2,R′
1,R′
2}
and let S be a ﬁnite union of segments in [0,M]. If on S, FR1 ≡ FR2 and
FR′
1 ≡ FR′
2, and on M \ S, FR1 ≡ FR′
1 and FR2 ≡ FR′
2, then R1  ∗ R2 iﬀ
R′
1  ∗ R′
2.
Lemma 1 If  ∗ on R is complete, transitive and satisﬁes continuity, FOSD,
and irrelevance, then there exists a countable additive measure ϑ on D :=
[0,∞] × [0,1] \ {(0,1)} such that
(i) For T = [a,b] × [p,q] ⊂ D such that a < b and p < q, 0 < ϑ(T) < ∞.
(ii) If C is an increasing curve in D, then ϑ(C) = 0.
(iii) For all R1,R2 ∈ R, R1  ∗ R2 iﬀ ϑ(Ro
1 \ Ro
2)   ϑ(Ro
2 \ Ro
1).
Proof: For t > 0, let Rt be the set of lotteries in R \ {δt} with outcomes not
exceeding t. The following Claim is part of Lemma 1 in Segal [15].
Claim 1 If   on Rt satisfy continuity, FOSD, and irrelevance, then there
exists a countable additive measure ϑt on Dt := [0,t] × [0,1] \ {(0,1),(t,1)}
such that
5(i) For S = [a,b] × [p,q] ⊂ Dt such that a < b and p < q, 0 < ϑ(S) < ∞.
(ii) If C is an increasing curve in Dt, then ϑ(C) = 0.
(iii) For all R1,R2 ∈ Rt, R1  ∗ R2 iﬀ ϑt(Ro
1 \ Ro
2)   ϑt(Ro
2 \ Ro
1).  
As for every t, ϑt is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant, we
may assume wlg that for all t,
ϑt
 
[0,min{t,1}] ×
 
1
3, 2
3
  
= ϑ1
 
[0,min{t,1}] ×
 
1
3, 2
3
  
(1)
Claim 2 Let t < s and suppose that for some A = [a,b] × [p,q] and B =
[a′,b′] × [p′,q′], A,B ⊂ Dt, ϑt(A) = ϑt(B). Then ϑs(A) = ϑs(B).
Proof: Consider ﬁrst the case where b   a′ and q   p′. By Claim 1,
ϑt(A) = ϑt(B) ⇐⇒
R1 = (a,p;b,p
′ − p;a
′,q
′ − p
′;b
′,1 − q
′) ∼ R2 = (a,q;b,p
′ − q;b
′,1 − p
′)
A
B
a b a′ b′ t s
p
q
p′
q′
Figure 1: B is to the north-east of A
But as R1,R2 ∈ Rs, it follows that R1 ∼ R2 iﬀ ϑs(A) = ϑs(B), hence ϑt(A) =
ϑt(B) iﬀ ϑs(A) = ϑs(B).
We now turn to the general case. Claim 1(ii) implies the following fact:
6Fact 1 Let the rectangle A be a subset of Dt. For every 0   λ   ϑt(A) there
is a rectangle B ⊂ A such that ϑt(B) = λ. ♦
Let A = [a,b] × [p,q] ⊂ Dt be a rectangle with a non-empty interior. Let
c,c′ ∈ (a,b) and r ∈ (p,q) such that ϑt(Ai) = 1
4ϑt(A), where
• A1 = [a,c] × [p,r]
• A2 = [c,b] × [p,r]
• A3 = [a,c′] × [r,q]
• A4 = [c′,b] × [r,q]
As (0,1),(t,1)  ∈ Dt, and therefore, not in A, it follows that there are ε,ε′ ∈
(0,
1
2) and n such that ϑt(E1) = ϑt(E2) =
ϑt(A)
4n , where
• E1 = [0,ε] × [0,ε]
• E2 = [t − ε′,t] × [1 − ε′,1]
and for every i ∈ {1,...,4} there either Ai ∩ E1 = ∅ or Ai ∩ E2 = ∅.
Partition each Ai, i = 1,...,4 into n stripes Aij, j = 1,...,n such that
ϑt(Aij) =
ϑt(A)
4n . By Claim 2, using E1 and E2, ϑs(Aij) = ϑs(E1) = ϑs(E2),
i = 1,...,4, j = 1,...,n, hence
ϑs(A) = 4nϑs(E1) (2)
For given rectangles A and B, such E1, E2, and n can be chosen to ac-
commodate both rectangles, hence by eq. (2), if ϑt(A) = ϑt(B), then ϑs(A) =
ϑs(B).  
Let t < s. By Claim 2, ϑt and ϑs represent the same measure on Dt, and
must therefore be a linear transformation of each other. By eq. (1) they agree
on [0,min{t,1}] ×
 
1
3, 2
3
 
, therefore on Dt, ϑt ≡ ϑs. Deﬁne now ϑ on bounded
subsets of [0,∞) × [0,1] by
ϑ([a,b] × [p,q]) = ϑb+1([a,b] × [p,q]) (3)
7As for every R1,R2 ∈ R there is t such that R1,R2 ∈ Rt, and as on Dt+1, ϑ
and ϑt+1 coincide, Lemma 1 now follows from Claim 1.  
As V is continuous,  ∗ satisﬁes continuity. We show that our assumptions
on   imply that  ∗ satisﬁes FOSD and irrelevance.
The following result is proved from the Archimedean property of  .
Lemma 2 For all lotteries Ψ(X,Y ), V (Ψ(X,Y )) ≥ V (0,1).
Proof: (i) Suppose ﬁrst that Y   X, hence V (Ψ(X,Y )) ≥ V (Ψ(Y,X)).
Deﬁne X′ = (x′
1,S1;...;x′
n,Sn) where
x
′
i =
 
xi if xi < yi
yi if xi ≥ yi
By monotonicity of   we have X   X′ and by transitivity, Y   X′. But
Ψ(X′,Y ) = Ψ(X,Y ) and Ψ(Y,X′) = (0,1), hence Y   X′ implies V (Ψ(X,Y )) ≥
V (0,1).
(ii) Suppose now that X   Y . Let T = {s : X(s) > Y (s)}. Deﬁne
Y ′ = (y′
1,S1;...;y′
n,Sn) where
y
′
i =
 
xi if yi   xi
yi if yi > xi
By monotonicity, Y ′   X, but as Ψ(X,Y ) = Ψ(X,Y ′), the claim follows from
(i).  
Lemma 3 For every x and r ≥ 0 there is y ≥ x such that ψ(x,y) = r.
Proof: Let ¯ rx = supy ψ(x,y) and suppose ¯ rx < ∞. Either for all r   ¯ rx,
V (¯ rx; 1
n;0,1 − 1
n) ≥ V (r, 1
n;0,1 − 1
n), in which case set r∗ = ¯ rx, or, by the
continuity of V , there is r∗ < ¯ rx such that for all 0   r′   ¯ rx, V (r∗,
1
n;0,1 −
1
n) ≥ V (r′, 1
n;0,1 − 1
n). Let P(Sn) = 1
n. By the Archimedean assumption,
there is yn such that (yn,Sn;0,S \ Sn) ≻ (x,S). Hence by Lemma 2, for all n
V (0,1) ≤ V
 
ψ(0,x),1 −
1
n
;0,
1
n
 
< V
 
ψ(x,yn),
1
n
;0,1 −
1
n
 
≤ V
 
r
∗,
1
n
;0,1 −
1
n
 
→ V (0,1)
8A contradiction. As ψ(x,y) is unbounded (as a function of y), it follows by
continuity that there is y such that ψ(x,y) = r.  
For any comparison lottery R that dominates R′ by FOSD one can con-
struct X ∼ Y such that Ψ(X,Y ) = R, and an X′ dominated by X such that
Ψ(X′,Y ) = R′. This construction is used to prove the next lemma.
Lemma 4  ∗ satisﬁes FOSD.
Proof: Let regret lottery R dominate regret lottery R′ by FOSD. Assume
ﬁrst that P(R = 0) > 0. By the Archimedean and continuity assumptions
there are X and Y such that X ∼ Y and Ψ(X,Y ) = R. To see this, let
R = (r1,p1;...;rn,pn) where r1 = 0 and p1 > 0. Deﬁne (xi,yi,Si), i = 2,...,n
such that ψ(xi,yi) = ri (this can be done by Lemma 3) and P(Si) = pi. Also,
let y1 = 0 and x1 be such that X = (xi,Si)i ∼ Y = (yi,Si)i. By deﬁnition,
V (Ψ(X,Y )) = V (Ψ(Y,X)).
Let now X′ be such that it agrees with X whenever xi ≥ yi, and for all Si
such that xi < yi, let x′
i ∈ [xi,yi] be such that ψ(x′
i,yi) = r′
i (assume wlg that
R = (ri,pi)i and R′ = (r′
i,pi)i where for all i, ri ≥ r′
i). As X′ dominates X by
FOSD and X ∼ Y it follows that X′   Y , hence
V (R
′) = V (Ψ(X
′,Y )) ≤ V (Ψ(Y,X
′)) = V (Ψ(Y,X)) = V (Ψ(X,Y )) = V (R)
The argument for the case where P(R = 0) = 0 follows by continuity.  
Next, we show that  ∗ satisﬁes irrelevance. The proof relies on state
independence of  ; we repeatedly use the fact that if two random variables
X and Y have the same probability distribution then X ∼ Y and therefore
V (Ψ(X,Y )) = V (Ψ(Y,X)).
Equivalent areas in epigraphs of regret lotteries
Partition the state space into n equi-probable events, s1,s2,...,sn, with
P(si) = 1
n. Start with a rectangle A with height ha units on the equi-probable
grid; the opposite corners of A are at (ra,ia) and (r′
a,ia − ha) where ra < r′
a,
0 < ha < ia. We investigate whether there is (to the northeast of A) an
equivalent rectangle B with southwest corner at (rb,i′
a) and height hb units,
9where rb > r′
a, i′
a ≥ ia and 0 < hb ≤ n − i′
a. If equivalent rectangle B exists
then its northeast corner is at (r′
b,i′
a + hb), where r′
b ∈ [r′
a,rb) (see Figure 1).2
A is equivalent to B in that if we add A to and subtract B from the
epigraph of any regret lottery and the result is the epigraph of another regret
lottery, then this new regret lottery has the same value (as measured by the
functional V ) as the original regret lottery. The simplest (as in has fewest
steps) regret lottery R to which we can add A and from which can subtract
B is depicted in Figure 1. Its c.d.f. is
R ≡ {0,ia − ha; ra,ha; r
′
a,i
′
a − ia; rb,n − i
′
a}
We deﬁne X and X′ such that Ψ(X′,X) = R:
X ≡ (x1,s1;x2,s2;x3,s3;...;xk,sk;xk+1,sk+1;...;xn,sn)
X
′ ≡ (xk,s1;x1,s2;x2,s3;...;xk−1,sk;xk+1,sk+1;...;xn,sn)
where 0 = x1 < x2 < ... < xk, k = n − ia + ha + 1 are selected so that:
ψ(xℓ,xℓ+1) = ra, ∀ℓ = 1,2,...,ha
ψ(xℓ,xℓ+1) = rb, ∀ℓ = ha + 1,ha + 2,...,n − i
′
a + ha
ψ(xℓ,xℓ+1) = r
′
a, ∀ℓ = n − i
′
a + ha + 1,n − i
′
a + ha + 2,...,n − ia + ha
xn−ia+ha+2, xn−ia+ha+3,...,xn are arbitrary. Lemma 3 implies that we can
select xℓ, ℓ = 1,2,...,n − ia + ha + 1 that meet the conditions above.
If X is chosen over X′ then, as x1 < x2 < ... < xn−ia+ha+1, there is
regret only if s1 obtains. Thus, as depicted in Figure 1, Ψ(X,X′) has c.d.f
(0,
n−1
n ;rX,
1
n), where rX ≡ ψ(x1,xn−ia+ha+1).
Table 1
2Note that ha,hb,ia,i′
a are positive integers less than equal to n while ra,r′
a,r′
b,rb are
positive numbers.
100
i0 = ia − ha
ia
i′
a
i′
a + hb
n − 1
R = Ψ(X′,X)
A
Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ)
Ψ(X,X′) = Ψ(Xδ,X′
δ)
n
0 ra r′
a r′
b rb rX
B
Figure 2: Regret lotteries Ψ(X′,X), Ψ(X,X′) and rectangles A, B
R = Ψ(X,X′) =
Event X X′ Ψ(X′,X) Xδ X′
δ Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ) Ψ(Xδ,X′
δ)
s1 x1 xn−ia+ha+1 0 x1 xn−ia+ha+1 0 rX
s2 x2 x1 ra x2 + δ2 x1 r′
a 0
s3 x3 x2 ra x3 + δ3 x2 + δ2 r′
a 0
. . .
sha+1 xha+1 xha ra xha+1 + δha+1 xha + δha r′
a 0
sha+2 xha+2 xha+1 rb xha+2 + δha+2 xha+1 + δha+1 r′
b 0
. . .
shb+ha+1 xhb+ha+1 xhb+ha rb xhb+ha+1 xhb+ha + δhb+ha r′
b 0
shb+ha+2 xhb+ha+2 xhb+ha+1 rb xhb+ha+2 xhb+ha+1 rb 0
. . .
sn−i′
a+ha+1 xn−i′
a+ha+1 xn−i′
a+ha rb xn−i′
a+ha+1 xn−i′
a+ha rb 0
sn−i′
a+ha+2 xn−i′
a+ha+2 xn−i′
a+ha+1 r′
a xn−i′
a+ha+2 xn−i′
a+ha+1 r′
a 0
. . .
sn−ia+ha+1 xn−ia+ha+1 xn−ia+ha r′
a xn−ia+ha+1 xn−ia+ha r′
a 0
sn−ia+ha+2 xn−ia+ha+2 xn−ia+ha+2 0 xn−ia+ha+2 xn−ia+ha+2 0 0
. . .
sn xn xn 0 xn xn 0 0
Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ) is the regret lottery obtained by adding A to and subtracting
B from the epigraph of Ψ(X′,X). We obtain X′
δ and Xδ from X′ and X by
increasing x2,x3,...,xhb+ha to x2+δ2,x3+δ3,...,xhb+ha+δhb+ha, as indicated in
the ﬁfth and sixth columns of Table 1. We have to ascertain whether positive
δ2,δ3,...,δhb+ha can be selected so that the regrets listed in column seven are
11obtained. By Lemma 3 we can select δ2,...,δha+1 such that
ψ(x1,x2 + δ2) = ψ(xℓ + δℓ,xℓ+1 + δℓ+1) = r
′
a, ∀ℓ = 2,3,...,ha.
The question is whether there exist δℓ > 0, ℓ = ha + 2,...,hb + ha such that
xhb+ha+1 > xhb+ha + δhb+ha, ψ(xhb+ha + δhb+ha,xhb+ha+1) ≥ r′
a and
ψ(xℓ+δℓ,xℓ+1+δℓ+1) = ψ(xhb+ha+δhb+ha,xhb+ha+1), ∀ℓ = ha+2,...,hb+ha−1
(4)
If the answer to this question is yes, then deﬁne r′
b ≡ ψ(xhb+ha+δhb+ha,xhb+ha+1);
clearly, r′
b < rb and there exists a rectangle B of height hb with its southwest
corner at (rb,i′
a) that will be shown to be equivalent to A. If the answer is no,
then there does not exist any such rectangle equivalent to B. We note that
if r′
a is close enough to ra then an rectangle B equivalent to A can always be
found.
Assume that condition (4) is satisﬁed and that r′
b ∈ [r′
a,rb) exists. Be-
cause X ∼ X′ and Xδ ∼ X′
δ we have V (Ψ(X,X′)) = V (Ψ(X′,X)) and
V (Ψ(Xδ,X′
δ)) = V (Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ)). But as Ψ(X,X′) = Ψ(Xδ,X′
δ), it follows
that V (Ψ(X′,X)) = V (Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ)). Observe that Ψ(Xδ,X′
δ) is obtained by
adding A to and subtracting B from Ψ(X,X′). Therefore we conclude that
A is equivalent to B, at least w.r.t. to regret lotteries Ψ(X′,X) and Ψ(X′
δ,
Xδ), where the lotteries X,X′,Xδ, and X′
δ are generated as in Table 1.
Let y1,...,yn be another set of outcomes from which lotteries Y,Y ′ that
generate ψ(Y ′,Y ) = R can be constructed (with yℓ in place of xℓ, ℓ =
1,2,...,n in Table 1).3 It must be shown that this would also lead to the
same equivalent rectangles A, B. Let ǫ2,...,ǫha+1 be such that
ψ(y1,y2 + ǫ2) = ψ(yℓ + ǫℓ,yℓ+1 + ǫℓ+1) = r
′
a, ∀ℓ = 2,3,...,ha.
Let ǫℓ > 0, ℓ = ha +2,...,hb +ha be such that yhb+ha +ǫhb+ha < yhb+ha+1 and
ψ(yℓ + ǫℓ,yℓ+1 + ǫℓ+1) = ψ(yhb+ha + ǫhb+ha,yhb+ha+1), ∀ℓ = ha + 2,...,hb + ha − 1
Substitute ǫℓ for δℓ in Table 2 and call the resulting lotteries Yǫ,Y ′
ǫ. Note
that Ψ(X′,X) = Ψ(Y ′,Y )(= R), and Ψ(X,X′) = Ψ(Y,Y ′) = Ψ(Xδ,X′
δ) =
Ψ(Yǫ,Y ′
ǫ). Thus,
Ψ(X
′
δ,Xδ) ∼∗ Ψ(Y
′
ǫ,Yǫ) (5)
3By Lemma 3 we know that there exist an inﬁnite number of outcomes for underlying
lotteries Y,Y ′ that generate ψ(Y ′,Y ) = R.
12Let r∗
b ≡ ψ(yhb+ha + ǫhb+ha,yhb+ha+1). If r∗
b < r′
b then Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ) domi-
nates Ψ(Y ′
ǫ,Yǫ) by FOSD and if r∗
b > r′
b then Ψ(Y ′
ǫ,Yǫ) dominates by FOSD
Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ); in either event Ψ(X′
δ,Xδ)  ∼∗ Ψ(Y ′
ǫ,Yǫ), contradicting (5). There-
fore, we have r∗
b = r′
b. Hence, A and B are equivalent w.r.t. R regardless of
the money outcomes used to generate R.
0
ia − ha
ia
i′
a
i′
a + hb
n − 1
Ψ(Z′,Z)
Ψ(Z′
δ,Zδ)
Ψ(Z,Z′) = Ψ(Zδ,Z′
δ)
A
n
0 ra r′
a r′
b rb rZ
B
Figure 3: Regret lotteries Ψ(Z′,Z), Ψ(Z′
δ,Zδ) and rectangles A, B
Next, it must be shown that the deﬁnition of equivalent rectangles is inde-
pendent of the underlying regret lottery to which A/B are added/subtracted.
The c.d.f. of any regret lottery, Ψ(Z′,Z), to which the rectangles A and B can
be added and subtracted, respectively, must be as depicted in Figure 3. That
is,
Prob[Ψ(Z
′,Z) < ra] ≤
ia − ha
n
(6)
Prob[Ψ(Z
′,Z) < r
′
a] = Prob[Ψ(Z
′,Z) ≤ ra] =
ia
n
(7)
Prob[Ψ(Z
′,Z) < r
′
b] = Prob[Ψ(Z
′,Z) < rb] =
i′
a
n
(8)
Prob[Ψ(Z
′,Z) ≤ rb] ≥
i′
a + hb
n
(9)
Inequalities in (6)–(9) ensure that Ψ(Z′,Z) places zero probability (on regrets)
in the intervals (ra,r′
a) and (r′
b,rb) respectively and place probability (at least)
ha
n on ra and (at least)
hb
n on rb. In addition, let r1,r2,...,rm ∈ (0,ra]∪[r′
a,r′
b]∪
13[rb,∞) be the (other) positive values at which Ψ(Z′,Z) places probability 1
n
each. Note that rℓ, ℓ = 1,2,...,m need not be distinct and that m+ha+hb <
n. The only restriction on the (relative) magnitudes of r1,r2,...,rm is that
(6)–(9) are satisﬁed. For instance, |{rℓ |rℓ > rb, ℓ = 1,2,...,m}| ≤ n−i′
a−hb.
In the Table 2 below, x1,x2,...,xhb+ha+1 and δ1,δ2,...,δhb+h are the same
as in Table 1. The outcomes z1,z2,...,zm are selected such that ψ(xhb+ha+1,z1) =
r1 and ψ(zℓ,zℓ+1) = rℓ+1, ℓ = 2,3,...,rm. Deﬁne rZ ≡ ψ(x1,zm).
Table 2
Ψ(Z,Z′) =
Event Y Y′ Ψ(Z′,Z) Zδ Z′
δ Ψ(Z′
δ,Zδ) Ψ(Zδ,Z′
δ)
s1 x1 zm 0 x1 zm 0 rZ
s2 x2 x1 ra x2 + δ2 x1 r′
a 0
s3 x3 x2 ra x3 + δ3 x2 + δ2 r′
a 0
. . .
sha+1 xha+1 xha ra xha+1 + δha+1 xha + δha r′
a 0
sha+2 xha+2 xha+1 rb xha+2 + δha+2 xha+1 + δha+1 r′
b 0
. . .
shb+ha+1 xhb+ha+1 xhb+ha rb xhb+ha+1 xhb+ha + δhb+ha r′
b 0
shb+ha+2 z1 xhb+ha+1 r1 z1 xhb+ha+1 r1 0
shb+ha+3 z2 z1 r2 z2 z1 r2 0
. . .
shb+ha+m+1 zm zm−1 rm zm zm−1 rm 0
shb+ha+m+2 zm+1 zm+1 0 zm+1 zm+1 0 0
. . .
sn zn zn 0 xn xn 0 0
Since Z ∼ Z′ and Zδ ∼ Z′
δ, we obtain that V (Ψ(Z,Z′)) = V (Ψ(Z′,Z)) and
V (Ψ(Zδ,Z′
δ)) = V (Ψ(Z′
δ,Zδ)). But as Ψ(Z′,Z) = Ψ(Z′
δ,Zδ), it follows that
V (Ψ(Z,Z′)) = V (Ψ(Zδ,Z′
δ)). Thus, the equivalence of rectangles A and B is
independent of the regret lottery they are add/subtracted from.
Lemma 5  ∗ satisﬁes irrelevance.
2.2 V is linear in probability
From Section 2.1 we conclude that there is a measure ϑ on D = [0,∞]×[0,1]
such that for any regret lottery R, V (R) = ϑ(Ro). This is exploited next to
conclude:
14Lemma 6 V is linear in probability. That is,
ϑ([a,b] × [α,β]) = Kab(β − α), ∀b > a ≥ 0, 1 ≥ β > α ≥ 0 (10)
Proof: The proof is in two steps. First, we show that (10) is true when
1 ≥ β > α ≥ 2
3.
(i) Take b > a = 0. Let x1 ≥ 0 be arbitrary and x2 and x3 be such that
ψ(x1,x2) = ψ(x2,x3) = b. Deﬁne b∗ ≡ ψ(x1,x3). Clearly, b∗ > b. Let p, q > 0,
p + q < 1
3. Deﬁne lotteries X1, X2 as follows.
Table 3
Event s1 s4 s7 s2 s5 s8 s3 s6 s9
P(si) p p p q q q 1
3 − p − q 1
3 − p − q 1
3 − p − q
X1 x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3 x2 x3 x1
X2 x3 x1 x2 x1 x2 x3 x3 x2 x1
X1 ∼ X2 as each of these lotteries gives x1, x2, and x3 with probability
1
3 each.
Thus, Ψ(X1,X2) ∼∗ Ψ(X2,X1) and
V (0,
2
3
+ q;ψ(x2,x3),
1
3
− p − q;ψ(x1,x3),p) = V (0,
2
3
+ q − p;ψ(x1,x2),p;ψ(x2,x3),
1
3
− q)
Noting that b = ψ(x1,x2) = ψ(x2,x3) and b∗ = ψ(x1,x3) we obtain
V (0,
2
3 + q;b,
1
3 − p − q;b∗,p) = V (0,
2
3 + q − p;b,
1
3 + p − q)
As V has a measure representation from Figure 3 we conclude that for all
q, p > 0 such that p + q < 1
3,
ϑ
 
[0,b] ×
 
2
3 + q − p, 2
3 + q
  
= ϑ([b,b∗] × [1 − p,1])
Fix q∗, p∗ such that q∗ > p∗ > 0, and p∗ + q∗ < 1
3 and obtain for all n and
i < n,
ϑ
 
[0,b] ×
 
2
3 +
 
q∗ −
ip∗
n
 
−
p∗
n , 2
3 +
 
q∗ −
ip∗
n
   
= ϑ
 
[b,b∗] ×
 
1 −
p∗
n ,1
  
This implies for all n and i,j < n,
ϑ
 
[0,b] ×
 
2
3 +
 
q∗ −
ip∗
n
 
−
p∗
n , 2
3 +
 
q∗ −
ip∗
n
   
=
ϑ
 
[0,b] ×
 
2
3 +
 
q∗ −
jp∗
n
 
−
p∗
n , 2
3 +
 
q∗ −
jp∗
n
   
15Hence ϑ is linear with respect to the vertical axis in the above range. By
varying q > p > 0 with p + q < 1
3 we see that (10) holds for 1 > β > α > 2
3
and any b > a = 0. By continuity (10) holds for 1 ≥ β > α ≥
2
3 and any
b > a = 0.
Figure 3
b∗ b
2
3 + q
p
2
3 + q − p Ψ(X2,X1)
Ψ(X1,X2)
Next, because ϑ is a measure which is linear in probability on [0,b]×[α,β]
and [0,a] × [α,β], where b > a > 0, 1 ≥ β > α ≥
2
3 we have
ϑ([0,b] × [α,β]) = ϑ([0,a] × [α,β]) + ϑ([a,b] × [α,β])
=⇒ Kb(β − α) = Ka(β − α) + ϑ([a,b] × [α,β])
Thus, (10) hold for 1 ≥ β > α ≥ 2
3.
(ii) Next, we establish (10) for 1 ≥ β > α ≥ 0. Let b > a = 0. Let x1 < x2
be such that ψ(x1,x2) = b. Select x3,x4,...,xn+1 such that ψ(xℓ,xℓ+1) = b,
ℓ = 1,2,...,n. Let ˆ b = ψ(x1,xn). Let 1
n+1 ≥ p > 0. Deﬁne lotteries X3, X4 as
follows.
Table 4
Event s1 s2 s3 ... sn+1 sn+2
P(si) p p p ... p 1 − (n + 1)p
X3 x1 x2 x3 ... xn+1 y
X4 xn+1 x1 x2 ... xn y
16X3 ∼ X4 as each of these lotteries has the same probability distribution over
outcomes. Thus, Ψ(X3,X4) ∼∗ Ψ(X4,X3) and
V (0,1 − p;ˆ b,p) = V (0,1 − np;b,np)
This, together with part (i) of the proof, implies that (see Figure 4)
Kˆ bp = ϑ([0,ˆ b] × [1 − p,1]) = ϑ([0,b] × [1 − np,1])
for any p ≤ 1
3. Thus, for any p < p′ ≤ 1
3 and n such that np′ ≤ 1 we have
ϑ([0,b] × [1 − np
′,1]) = ϑ([0,b] × [1 − np,1]) + ϑ([0,b] × [1 − np
′,1 − np))
=⇒ Kˆ b(p
′ − p) = ϑ([0,b] × [1 − np
′,1 − np))
By varying p,p′ and n we conclude that small, arbitrarily thin, slices are
linear in probability. For any β > α, the set ([0,b]×[α,β]) is the union of thin
horizontal slices and is therefore linear in probability.
Figure 4
ˆ b b
1 − p
p
1 − np
Ψ(X4,X3)
Ψ(X3,X4)
Arguments used in part (i) establish (10) for b > a > 0 and 1 ≥ β > α ≥ 0.  
2.3   is expected utility
Lemma A (Aczel [1]). If
G(x,y) + G(y,z) = G(x,z), ∀x < y < z
17then there exists g : ℜ → ℜ such that G(x,y) = g(x) − g(y).
Proof: Deﬁne
F(x,y) =



G(x,y), if x < y,
0, if x = y,
−G(y,x), if x > y
It may be veriﬁed that
F(x,y) + F(y,z) = F(x,z), ∀x,y,z.
Therefore, [1] (Theorem 1, p. 223) implies that there exists g : ℜ → ℜ such
that F(x,y) = g(x) − g(y).  
Lemma 7 There exist increasing functions u, v such that
ψ(x1,x2) = u
−1[v(x1) − v(x2)], ∀x2 ≥ x1 ≥ 0.
Proof: Select x1 < x2 < x3 and p,q > 0, p + q < 1
3. Deﬁne lotteries X5, X6
below.
Table 5
Event s1 s4 s7 s2 s5 s8 s3 s6 s9
P(si) p p p q q q 1
3 − p − q 1
3 − p − q 1
3 − p − q
X5 x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
X6 x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x1 x1 x2 x3
X5 ∼ X6 as each of these lotteries gives x1, x2, and x3 with probability 1
3 each.
Thus, Ψ(X5,X6) ∼∗ Ψ(X6,X5) and
V (0,1 − p − 2q; ψ(x1,x2),q; ψ(x2,x3),q; ψ(x1,x3),p)
= V (0,1 − 2p − q; ψ(x1,x2),p; ψ(x2,x3),p; ψ(x1,x3),q)
By Lemma 6, V is linear in probabilities. Therefore, there exists a function
u : ℜ → ℜ such that
(1 − p − 2q)u[0] + qu[ψ(x1,x2)] + qu[ψ(x2,x3)] + pu[ψ(x1,x3)]
= (1 − 2p − q)u[0] + pu[ψ(x1,x2)] + pu[ψ(x2,x3)] + qu[ψ(x1,x3)]
=⇒ u(0) + u[ψ(x1,x2)] + u[ψ(x2,x3)] + u[ψ(x1,x3) = 0, ∀x1 < x2 < x3
18Setting u(0) = 0 we have
u[ψ(x1,x2)] + u[ψ(x2,x3)] + u[ψ(x1,x3) = 0, ∀x1 < x2 < x3.
By Lemma A, there exists a function v : ℜ → ℜ such that u[ψ(x1,x2)] =
v(x1) − v(x2). Monotonicity of v and u follows from our assumptions about
regret.  
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